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an important debate is being waged 
within transitional and post-conflict 
societies concerning the need for retri-
bution or reconciliation. in the wake of 
various forms of aggression and serious 
human rights abuses, should the empha-
sis be on holding individuals accountable 
for their actions or on social harmony 
and tranquillity? should the focus be on 
retributive justice and offender account-
ability or on restorative justice and the 
re-establishment of interpersonal rela-
tionships between victim and perpetra-
tor (little 1999; Delaet 2006)? although 
it is difficult to predict which path a soci-
ety will follow, some will choose the path 
of reconciliation and restorative justice; 
when they do, they will be confronted 
with additional issues. 
some theorists think that the best, and 
perhaps the only way to achieve recon-
ciliation in places like Bosnia and Ko-
sovo is to attain restorative justice. Given 
the degree of victimization that has oc-
curred, they recommend the applica-
tion of the restorative justice model “in 
an effort to provide reparations, restore 
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aBstract
My optimism towards reconciliation in places 
like Bosnia and Kosovo has become increasingly 
guarded because of certain epistemical and ethi-
cal issues. reconciliation presumes the making of 
moral judgments about a wrongdoing, judgments 
that are empirically informed. if the perceptual 
judgments that are used to do the informing are 
made suspect because of a lapse in the common-
place self-restraints (or controls) on reasoning 
or glitches in the regulative ideals or epistemic 
goods like understanding and intelligibility, then 
the moral judgments on which they are grounded 
become suspect as well. This happens to both fa-
natic and non-fanatic. in this article i explore these 
issues by starting with spousal-like relationships 
that must sort out the demands for truth, moral 
decency, and harmony. sometimes epistemical 
difficulties preclude a couple from forgiveness 
and, thus, reconciliation, in which case harmony 
may only be achieved through a moral forgetful-
ness of the wrongdoing. The broader contention 
is that epistemical difficulties surrounding stories 
of competing ethno-national communties are 
even more imposing, thus making reconciliation 
ever so difficult. although moral forgetfulness is 
sometimes used in spousal-like relationships in 
order to maintain harmony, it is more difficult 
to adopt within post-conflict situations between 
ethno-national adversaries, thus leading some to 
accept a separate co-existence as the last resort on 
the road to peacebuilding.
Key words: commonplace self-restraints on rea-
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community, resolve conflict, restore both perpetrators and victims into the moral and 
social realms.., and provide accountability for the actions of perpetrators” (staub and 
pearlman 2001, 210). in this view, then, restorative justice becomes more or less a part 
of reconciliation. yet not all instances of reconciliation require such justice, in which 
case it seems only wise to separate the two and to view restorative justice as a tool to 
be used in the healing and reconciliation process when victims require reparations. 
it is reconciliation as detached from restorative justice, with a particular eye to how 
epistemical and ethical issues are related to reconciliation and beyond, that will be the 
focus of much of this work. 
i assume that reconciliation is needed and achievable in places like Bosnia and Ko-
sovo. What i do not take for granted—which is a presumption widely held by theo-
rists and practitioners alike—is the ease with which reconciliation can be achieved in 
post-conflict environments. it is anything but easy as shown by those who study the 
shame/rage spiral that follows torture, rape, and assault (cloke 2001, 91-92). however, 
my optimism towards reconciliation has become increasingly guarded not only by un-
derstanding the debilitating effects of shame and rage, but also by becoming aware of 
certain epistemical and ethical issues, issues that become more formidable once we 
move from ordinary situations involving a couple to those situations involving ethno-
nationalism in post-conflict societies. But what is this illusive process called reconcili-
ation that is supposedly so difficult to achieve and yet so needed for long lasting peace 
in places that suffer from the ravages of ethno-nationalism? 
as one might suspect, conflict resolution that is defined as achieving a cessation of 
violence and an acceptance of co-existence is necessary but not sufficient for a stable 
and harmonious peace between former ethno-national adversaries. needed for such 
harmony is reconciliation, the development of a mutual, conciliatory accommodation 
between formerly antagonistic groups (Kriesberg 2001, 48). at the heart of reconcili-
ation is “a psychological process, which consists of changes of the motivations, goals, be-
liefs, attitudes, and emotions of the majority of society members” (Bar-tal and Bennink 
2004, 17).1 achieving reconciliation, however, requires the transaction of asking for 
and giving interpersonal forgiveness, which entails the recognition of a moral judg-
ment followed by a letting go instead of seeking revenge (auerbach 2004, 157).2 and 
forgiveness as a process of letting go of the past and awakening of a more promising 
future has dramatically-felt consequences for those who forgive, for it is a way of re-
leasing themselves from the pain, anger, shame, and guilt they have experienced at the 
hands of their tormentors. accordingly, the central mission of those seeking to free 
themselves and others from the bitterness and the grievances of a protracted conflict 
1 See also Lederach 1997.
2 Much of the research on forgiveness has focused on interpersonal forgiveness (see, for example, Enright, 
Freedman, and Rique 1998; Jankélévitch 2005). However, some researchers have concentrated on intragroup 
forgiveness, which is how they believe forgiveness should be thought of in situations involving ethno-national 
conflicts. See Griswold 2007; Hewstone et al. 2008. 
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is to set in motion this cognitive and emotional process through which conflicted rela-
tionships become more amicable. 
in order to achieve reconciliation, people of different ethno-national identities living 
in post-conflict societies are often advised first to listen, understand, and tolerate sto-
ries that oppose theirs; and then finally to accept, at least in part, those stories as legiti-
mate.3 The underlying presumption is that stories, which run the gamut from accurate, 
real-life testimonies of conflict situations to life narratives that are metaphors of reality 
to folktales to parables, present us with opportunities for learning, growth, and change 
(cloke and Goldsmith 2000; senehi 2000; Botcharova 2001; paterson 2008). While fic-
tional tales may be taken as sources of assumptions and truths about us as well as those 
with whom we are in conflict, it is those stories presented in the form of testimonies 
that are most important in this regard, and thus are most helpful in bettering under-
standing.
so it appears that the regulative ideal at work in reconciliation is that of understanding, 
coherence, or intelligibility (Dwyer 1999, 85-86). stories can be used to help people 
understand the past. They can also help people deal with the past insofar as testimo-
nies are thought to be instrumental in building bridges between adversaries. stories 
do this by identifying common ground and discovering how each perpetrated injuries 
on the other, particularly with atrocities and gross violations of human rights. By plac-
ing reconciliation on the “level of meaning-making,” some theorists have abandoned 
forgiveness as a necessary component in the reconciliation process. instead, the task of 
reconciliation is about “bringing apparently incompatible descriptions of events into 
narrative equilibrium” (Dwyer 1999, 89). in other words, the reconciliation process 
moves forward as the disputants develop a mutually tolerable set of interpretations of 
events that allows them to manage the tension between them. 
i think this is right as far as it goes. What i want to add, however, is that the regulative 
ideals or epistemic goods go well beyond understanding and intelligibility to include 
trustworthiness, credibility, and knowledge (Zagzebski 2009, 9-16). There are also the 
intellectual virtues that are often cited, such as humility (vs. arrogance), empathy (vs. 
narrow-mindedness), integrity (vs. hypocrisy), perseverance (vs. laziness), and auton-
omy (vs. conformity). last, but not least, is the moral obligation to care about true 
belief itself (Zagzebski 2009, 9-19). if we must care about having true beliefs in the do-
mains in which we have a caring interest as well as those in which we must have a car-
ing interest, and morality is a domain that we must care about, and reconciliation falls 
within the domain of morality, then morality demands of us that we conscientiously 
hold beliefs (i.e., beliefs that are guided by a concern for truth) about the workings of 
reconciliation. although this conscientiousness in belief may well cover some of the 
3 It is worth noting that a similar regard for others’ views is shown by some who argue for deliberative democ-
racy, particularly those who highlight “internal deliberations,” which lead to the internalization of others’ perspec-
tives. See, for example, Goodin 2003, 169-93.
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other epistemic goods like understanding and intelligibility, caring about the truth ap-
pears to be a very important part of our lives, for the truth helps to adjudicate disputes. 
When people’s beliefs conflict with one another, the adjudication process includes the 
weighing of evidence for those beliefs to determine which one(s) are true and which 
one(s) are false. 
Earlier i mentioned that stories, especially in the form of testimonies, play an impor-
tant part in understanding. one way they do this is by disclosing moral judgments 
pertaining to wrongdoing. That sort of disclosure is extremely important in any rec-
onciliation process. however, stories also make truth claims about the objects of those 
judgments, without which the application of moral theories and concepts to human 
situations would be arbitrary.4 it is the disclosure of truth claims that is crucial for the 
re-establishment of interpersonal relationships through the process of reconciliation.
it is the empirical informing of moral judgments, however, that makes reconcili-
ation through the use of stories a messy business because even though people gen-
erally agree on the importance of truth, what is taken to be the truth regarding the 
past (and present) is often the subject of fierce debate. This is not something that only 
a fanatic, whose reasoning leads to conclusions that seem to many to be contrary to 
both common sense and the most rudimentary of ethical prohibitions, is prone to do, 
however. The same lack of commonplace self-restraints on reasoning (i.e., epistemic 
goods, intellectual virtues, and one’s background beliefs and values) that leads the fa-
natic to be self-righteous, intolerant, overly certain, and zealous can also plague the 
non-fanatic who simply wants to “get it right.” in short, it can happen to the best of 
us. regardless of these obstacles, the effectiveness of storytelling may still depend on 
“people believ[ing] personal narratives in a way that they believe nothing else from an 
adversary” (Gopin 2000, 130). assuming that all disputants are good epistemic agents, 
that is, persons who believe propositions because they have epistemic reasons (which 
increase the probability that one’s beliefs are true), the opposing stories would have to 
satisfy the demand of empirical credibility. in a very real sense, then, meeting epistem-
ic requirements is continuously demanded of us. 
however, it is whether the stories of one ethno-national community offer propositions 
to another ethno-national community that are as worthy of its believing as those of 
its own stories, which casts doubt on the efficacy of using stories for reconciliation. it 
does not seem to be self-evident that claims about the nature of the crimes and identi-
ties of those responsible are likely to be endorsed by different ethno-national commu-
nities that have been engaged in a bitter and protracted conflict, which is in part about 
ethno-national identities. My skepticism arises in two ways. first, the commonplace 
self-restraints on reasoning are likely to be undermined by defensive maneuvers that 
protect one’s ethnic identity. if “conflicting narratives serve as the cornerstones of the 
4 For discussions on the relationship between moral arguments and empirical claims, see Gutmann and Thomp-
son 1996, 14-15; Louden 1992, 127-29.
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respective collective identities and are, therefore, almost immune to change” (auer-
bach 2004, 157), then it is not surprising that people indulge in maneuvers such as 
self-deception and reliance on sympathetic sources for their favored beliefs when their 
ethnic identity is perceived to be threatened (adler 2007, 267). This is especially true 
in post-conflict situations. it may seem as though it is only ethno-nationalist fanatics 
lacking self-restraints, the absence of which prevents them from adequately testing the 
veracity of their claims, who believe they have “gotten it right.” This is wrong, how-
ever. 
The second source of skepticism arises from the fact that no matter how hard we want 
“the world to determine what we believe,” thus providing us with some sort of bed-
rock objectivity, it must not be forgotten that our reliance on evidence to restrain new 
beliefs is set against our background beliefs and values that possess a dominant and 
foundational status for us. There is no guarantee that those beliefs and values are right, 
warranted, or justified, or that we will “get it right” when we filter the evidence through 
our background beliefs and values. skepticism informs not only perceptual judgments 
but also normative judgments of all who are less than fanatical. left with doubts at a 
most fundamental epistemic level, we ponder whether the truth claims of one ethno-
national community could ever be taken as defensible by another such community. 
and if the truth claims are placed in doubt, then the moral judgments upon which 
they are empirically informed are also placed in doubt; thus making it ever more dif-
ficult to re-establish interpersonal relationships that are at the heart of a reconciliation 
process which strives to achieve harmony. it is these difficulties associated with truth, 
morality, and reconciliation that will be discussed in the course of this rather different 
sort of project. 
i will approach these concerns in a circuitous way by examining how the twin demands 
for truth and moral decency within personal relationships (i.e., spousal-like relation-
ships) are tempered by the further demand for harmony. although it is reasonable to 
believe that forgiveness followed by reconciliation may be the only means to achieving 
the restoration of relationships and healing (lederach 1997; shonholtz 1998; Wilmer 
1998; Botcharova 2001; hicks 2001; staub and pearlman 2001; Volf 2001; Bar-tal and 
Bennink 2004), and thus a harmonious state, given the difficulties inherent in defend-
ing the perceptual and normative claims upon which reconciliation ultimately rests, it 
is also reasonable to believe that bringing about a harmonious state by anything short 
of a “moral forgetfulness” of a wrongdoing may be extremely difficult at times. The 
broader contention is that the epistemical concerns surrounding stories of compet-
ing ethno-national communities within post-conflict settings are even more imposing, 
thus making forgiveness and reconciliation both more difficult and more necessary for 
there to be harmony between former adversaries. yet the fact that epistemical concerns 
may make the acceptance of normative judgments and the ensuing reconciliation diffi-
cult does not mean that moral forgetfulness as a means to achieving social harmony is 
readily achievable. indeed, the fact that atrocities and gross violations of human rights 
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were perpetrated may make forgetting that they ever took place unthinkable to many 
because of the strong sense of retributive justice felt by those who have suffered. 
2. Epistemical and normative concerns within personal  
 relationships—harmony?
i want to begin with some reasonable propositions. first, personal relationships, or 
to be more exact, spousal-like relationships, are much sought after by many people. 
people want enduring and intimate relationships. second, once people find themselves 
in such a relationship, it is common for their relationship to be plagued by various dis-
putes. some arise due to relatively minor disagreements about physical surroundings, 
while others are caused by morally contentious situations that stress pit one member 
of the relationship against the other. in other words, some disputes are over how the 
world is, while others involve how the world should be. Theses references to the world 
can include the relationship in question described in terms of how it does exist versus 
how it should exist. 
although both kinds of dispute can be extremely emotional, sometimes leading to 
the use of disrespectful language and even acts of violence, it has long been held that 
people stay clear of emotionally charged language and other rhetorical devices that 
manipulate people into acknowledging the veracity of claims. instead, arguments or 
some other rational method of defending or justifying statements is deemed to be the 
epistemically preferred means of adjudication. rational methods are given preferential 
status because evidentiary concerns are crucial to determining a claim’s truth. The use 
of evidence is thought to be part of the proof for the correctness of a person’s descrip-
tion of the world. consequently, each member of a spousal-like relationship may cite 
evidence for claims that assert, for example, that certain physical objects exist nearby 
or that the couple has a very loving, caring, and affectionate relationship; and these 
individuals do so in both cases by pointing to the objects themselves or to the practices 
that denote such a relationship. 
The epistemic approach is one that is not exhibited to the same degree by every person 
in resolving a dispute over matters of fact. some give up far sooner than they should. 
let us examine two cases of perceptual claims, the first involving the perception of a 
mountain and the second involving the perception of flirtatious behavior. 
imagine a couple is walking through Baščaršija, the old town of sarajevo. While look-
ing at the various people passing by and the different structures that have been built 
over the centuries, the Bosnian woman turns to her american partner and says, “i see 
that that is Mt. trebević rising behind the buildings on the other side of the Miljacka 
river.” The american is new to the city, so he asks, “how do you know it’s trebević?” 
The woman turns and politely says to him, “i have lived here all my life, and i can see 
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that it is.” if he wants to eat dinner at princess park restaurant, which is on the north 
slope of trebević, and continues to have many doubts about what she claims to see, 
he might ask, “What makes you think that’s trebević that you see?” in this case, what 
is asked for is another statement in relation to which “That is Mt. trebević” is more 
probable than not (chisholm 1957, 54-58). The woman is asked to delve into her back-
ground beliefs to support her perceptual claim. 
one possible response could be the following: “i can see that the mountain rises from 
the eastern portion of the city and that it has a large communication tower on its peak. 
There is no other mountain that looks like that anywhere near sarajevo.” so the origi-
nal perceptual claim about Mt. trebević is now justified by reference to a different per-
ception, one that claims that the mountain is located in a certain part of the city and 
that it has a man-made structure on its peak, as well as by a statement of independent 
information (i.e., “no other mountain ... looks like that anywhere near sarajevo”). 
of course, the man may continue to harbor grave doubts about whether she sees Mt. 
trebević, at which point he may either challenge her statement of independent infor-
mation (“Why do you say that there is no other mountain with that appearance in 
sarajevo?”) or question the new perceptual statement (“Why do you think that you 
see a communication tower on the peak?”). if he continues to challenge her perceptual 
statements, she will continue to provide more of them. in a defense of the claim to 
see a communication tower, she might say, “i see it’s rectangular and that it’s white.” if 
questioned further, she could respond by saying that “it looks white from this spot in 
Baščaršija, and if anything that far away looks white, it is probably white.” This is not a 
perceptual claim, but one that says something about what appears. in reality, however, 
it is likely that she will not tolerate this questioning for very long, at which point she 
may simply say “take a look for yourself!” as she walks away. 
is this discussion about the veracity of perceptual claims of a mountain too much like 
doing analytic philosophy in a British sort of way? i do not think so—not in a discus-
sion about the difficulties that disputes pose to people and the way people sometimes 
use a variety of strategies, like the use of stories, to resolve them. understanding the 
difficulties that arise when stories are used in rebuilding relationships between peoples 
of different ethno-national communities is aided by inquiring into the difficulties that 
people face when even their most modest claims, especially those that are perceptual 
in nature, are challenged. 
The case of seeing a physical object like a mountain is one thing. not much typically 
rides on such disputes. But what happens when we are dealing with something more 
important, such as whether this couple has a loving and respectful relationship. That 
one partner is alleged to have flirted with someone else is important because spouse-
like partners tend to define their relationship in ways that allow certain practices and 
disallow others (which typically includes flirting with someone other than one’s part-
ner), thereby placing specific demands on each other in terms of equality, deserts, and 
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rights. indeed, it is quite common to hear one partner or the other at some point use 
statements like “i deserve to be treated with respect” and “i have the right to be treated 
is such and such a manner.” if the case of the disputed mountain could lead to a spiral-
ling defense, a situation involving the charge of misconduct could prove to be even 
more difficult to resolve because an important feature of the guilt or innocence of a 
person is whether that person intended to engage in that kind of behavior or whether 
it was an accident or even the result of an unfortunate set of circumstances beyond her 
control. 
let us suppose that the same couple is on their way from split to rijeka by train. after 
a long day of carrying heavy bags, the couple hurries to the closest passenger car and 
is the first to take up seats in a compartment meant for four. Before the train leaves the 
station just before midnight, two women join them in the compartment. pleasantries 
are exchanged, but eventually the lights are turned off so that they can all sleep. all 
four eventually doze off, though the woman wakes up and stares at her partner. she 
sees that the woman closest to her partner has edged closer to him with her back such 
that their backsides are both touching. This continues for much of the night. upon the 
train’s arrival in rijeka, the couple goes to a hotel, at which point the woman confronts 
him with the allegation of flirtatious behaviour. 
how might this be played out? she might say, “i saw you rubbing up against that wom-
an on the train, and you must have enjoyed it.” he looks confused upon hearing this 
and begins to ponder that there are two issues, one dealing with the physical touching 
per se, and the other having to do with enjoyment and intentionality. addressing the 
physical issue first, he might say, “What makes you think that i made contact with her 
in that manner?” she might say, “i am a woman, and i know what i saw, and i saw your 
bodies touching in that way. i was up most of the night watching you.” if he continues 
to have doubts about what she claims to have seen, he might ask, “What makes you 
think i was intentionally rubbing against that woman instead of experiencing inciden-
tal contact?” her response might be the following: “your rear end was moving with 
hers and no other part of your two bodies was touching. if it was incidental contact, 
you would have jerked away. But you didn’t.” so what was first justified by reference to 
perception (“i saw you rubbing up against that woman on the train”) is now justified 
by reference to a different perception, albeit recollected (seeing a certain part of two 
bodies moving together), as well as a statement of independent information (i.e., “if it 
was incidental contact, you would have jerked away. But you didn’t.”). 
let us suppose that he tires of doubting her perceptual claims but challenges her state-
ment of independent information. he might ask, “Why do you say if it was incidental 
contact i would have jerked away?” she might respond, “you would have jerked away 
because you would have felt uncomfortable. But you didn’t move, so you enjoyed it, 
and that was very disrespectful towards me.” This leads into the second issue of enjoy-
ment and intentionality, as well as the related normative issues of respect and trust, 
which are ultimately the issues that burden relationships. 
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it now becomes clear that the woman is relying on certain key background beliefs con-
cerning actions. one of those is the belief that if the flee response is not exhibited by 
her partner when he touches another, then the touching that is exhibited is intentional. 
another belief is that if there is continued touching, thus suggesting that the touching 
is intentional, then there is some degree of enjoyment being experienced by both indi-
viduals. however, whether the touching is intentional is predicated on the man’s being 
aware of what was going on. The fact that the touching continued is not sufficient evi-
dence that he was aware of the situation as his partner saw it. indeed, it is quite reason-
able to think that the man was sleeping, in which case it is difficult to understand how 
his actions were intentional and, thus, blameworthy. 
The moral judgment-making above is clearly more questionable than it would have 
been had the man been awake and acting with the intention of affecting people around 
him in specific ways, but whose actions had unintended consequences that could be 
construed as flirtatious. Blame could be assessed against him if it were reasonable to 
assume that he should have taken those consequences into account. But in the case at 
hand, the man is not aware of what is going on because he is sleeping. to make a moral 
judgment against him if he is aware of his actions is quite different from making such a 
judgment against him if he is not awake, at least to the extent that he would need to be 
in order to be held accountable for his actions. 
This leads to the issue of how this relationship can once again be harmonious. it might 
be thought that reconciliation will be the appropriate way to achieve the restoration 
of the relationship, and thus harmony. however, the obstacle that the woman faces in 
undergoing a change in her beliefs, attitudes, and emotions towards the man is that 
forgiveness is required, an act that involves “giving up the rage, the desire for ven-
geance, and a grudge toward those who have inflicted grievous harm” on her (Deutsch 
2008, 478). and for there to be forgiveness, the man must recognize the moral judg-
ment concerning the wrongdoing and responsibility that his partner has made against 
him (little 1999, 71-72; saunders 1999, 44-46).5 it is only when this happens that it is 
even possible for her to let go of his supposed indiscretion and the emotions that are 
5 It might be said that forgiveness does not require an acknowledgment of wrongdoing on the part of the wrong-
doer. To be sure, we may forgive someone who is dead or absent, in which case there is no such acknowledgment 
and forgiveness becomes more or less “self-help therapy” for the injured party. In a deeper sense, however, for-
giveness not only has the “effect of preventing the wrong from continuing to damage one’s self-esteem and one’s 
psyche” (North 1998, 18), but “forgiveness is a gift to others” (Enright, Freedman, and Rique 1998, 48). And as 
a gift, forgiveness “is supposed to make a difference to the wrongdoer as well as to ourselves, and it makes a 
difference in how we interact with the wrongdoer and with others” (North 1998, 19). If the gift of forgiveness is 
not accepted by the wrongdoer, an acceptance which would be predicated on the recognition that she has done 
something wrong in the first place, then the wrongdoer will not be impacted in a way that will allow her to enter 
into harmonious relations with the injured party. Given the relatedness that this work has with atrocities commit-
ted in the Balkans, it should also be noted that forgiveness in any sort of deep sense might not be a real possibility, 
for the wrongdoer might be a sadist. Furthermore, forgiveness might become a “conceptual impossibility” insofar 
as the sadist, seen as unredeemable, might be regarded “as so monstrous that we dismiss him from the moral 
universe which we inhabit” (North 1998, 28). I suggest, however, that such exile is only related to ruling out for-
giveness, for it seems to be quite appropriate to make moral judgments about people like Karadžić and Mladić. 
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associated with it. however, the man has scrutinized the perceptual claims and the 
statements of independent information offered by the woman to the point that these 
claims and statements have lost their efficacy. if he is an epistemic agent who will ac-
knowledge the woman’s moral judgment of him only if he has epistemic reasons, and 
if those reasons are not forthcoming, then he will not be forgiven. reconciliation will 
not be achieved. in a sense, her story has not been accepted by him. strange as it may 
seem, restoration of harmony may be still achieved but only if the parties engage in 
moral forgetfulness, meaning that the incident is forgotten at that moment and both 
continue in their relationship as though the incident never took place. This event is 
forgotten for now insofar as each of them adopts exclusionary reasons for ignoring the 
event, though it cannot be discounted that moral forgetfulness may eventually lead to 
literal forgetfulness. 
let me stress that my point is that social harmony rather than forgiveness and rec-
onciliation is predicated on moral forgetfulness. The caring interest that each partner 
has in re-establishing harmony in their relationship makes up the exclusionary reason 
that comprises their forgetfulness of the troublesome incident. There is a connection 
between forgetfulness and forgiveness/reconciliation but only insofar as the former is 
a result of the failure of the latter. But if that is the extent of this relationship, then 
the standard view of forgiveness which says that “forgiving is not the same as forget-
ting” (Enright, freedman, and rique 1998, 48); that “in forgiving, people are not being 
asked to forget” (tutu 1999, 271) is not compromised.6 The question now becomes, 
can moral forgetfulness be deemed morally acceptable? 
for present purposes, two points in this perspective are crucial. first, being morally 
forgetful is not a situation that is relevant to a general philosophical reflection about 
the nature and justification of moral principles à la Kant. The experience of forgetful-
ness does not arise on the more abstract level of rational discourse within which the 
moral grounds of personal responsibility are examined and decided upon. instead, it 
occurs in situations in which persons face an immediate need to decide what to do 
about an actual moral problem. in the case under investigation, the consequence may 
be the couple’s remaining together or choosing to end the relationship. The situation, 
at least to one of the parties, is that important. Thus, the decision to remain with the 
other would count as an exclusionary reason to put aside the harmful affair at least for 
now in order to edge closer to a more harmonious relationship. second, moral forget-
fulness will not/cannot be an option for the restoration of harmony when the couple 
is either unwilling or unable to examine the incident and to address it in at least a 
cursory evidentiary way. for example, the woman has not been portrayed as the def-
erential partner who feels the need to accept absolutely and indefinitely the suppos-
6 Aurel Kolnai (1973-74, 94) makes a distinction between forgiveness and various forms of “not taking offence,” 
such as indifference and non-imputation. Whereas forgiveness “digs deep into its object before it sets aside indig-
nation and cancels the retributive attitude,”indifference, for example, simply “looks away from” the wrong. In the 
case of moral forgetfulness, however, the “looking away from” is only temporary. 
r. J. conces  Epistemical and Ethical Troubles in Achieving Reconciliation, and then Beyond
31
edly humiliating incident in order to keep her man; the man has not been described 
as someone who “pockets” his partner’s love for him, and who takes that as giving 
him license to do what he pleases no matter how disrespectful and inconsiderate he 
is towards her. Forgetfulness has become an option in this case because forgiveness has 
in fact become epistemically problematic. The perceptual claims and the statements of 
independent information that empirically inform the moral judgment against the man 
come with difficulties that are uncovered by an epistemic agent, e.g., the man himself. 
consequently, if there are evidentiary concerns that prevent the man from accepting 
the moral judgment made against him, then forgiveness and reconciliation will not 
be a possible means to achieving harmony. Those same difficulties do not accompany 
the act of moral forgetfulness, though they must be faced in order to reach the act of 
forgiveness.
The simple act of forgetfulness is often taken to be a morally unacceptable response to 
serious transgressions within a spousal-like relationship for three reasons. first, it is 
thought that the individual who forgets an incident becomes less than an autonomous 
agent. But it is not in the classic sense of autonomy introduced by Kant that the person 
is said to be less autonomous. Kant took autonomy to be the foundation of human dig-
nity and the origin of morality because autonomy is a property of the wills of adult hu-
man beings who show themselves to be moral legislators by prescribing general moral 
principles. (Kant 1785, 1948). here, however, to be autonomous includes the situation 
in which a person a allows herself to adopt a second order reason q as an exclusion-
ary reason to refrain from acting on reason p concerning situation Z until she has had 
sufficient time to assess the seriousness of Z, as well as her future. since forgetfulness 
requires the adoption of an exclusionary reason, doing so would mean that the woman 
does in fact treat herself in a fundamentally respectful manner. But in what sense is the 
woman in question different from the Deferential Wife, one who exhibits the attitude 
of servility, thereby undermining her autonomy (hill, Jr. 1973, 5-6)? perhaps what sets 
the morally forgetful woman apart from the Deferential Wife is that even though the 
latter has an exclusionary reason (i.e., to stay with her man), she does not intend to 
assess this matter at a later date. in a sense, she gives up for good, but giving up is not 
something that an autonomous person can do. 
The other two reasons can be grouped together. first, because to simply forget about 
a harmful and/or humiliating action is not to do what one can to make sure that that 
sort of action does not happen again. perhaps it seems to condone what has been done. 
second, there is a healing aspect to forgiveness that is not present in forgetfulness: 
“[forgiveness] erases the humiliation that was suffered, replacing it with pride and 
positive self-esteem” (cloke 2001, 88). The same cannot be same of moral forgetful-
ness, which is in no way as satisfying as forgiveness. These reasons, however, fail to 
recognize the importance of moral forgetfulness when epistemical concerns cannot be 
met. indeed, moral forgetfulness may not be an objectionable alternative in terms of 
addressing the incident and promoting healing. although forgetting about the incident 
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is not the same as dealing with it at the moment, temporary forgetfulness will place the 
incident on hold until a time when the parties are better able to deal with the situation 
and its underlying issues. a period of relative calm can lead to clearer thinking and a 
new perspective of what happened in the past, a way of looking at things that cannot 
be attained at the time of the incident because of the emotional overlays of anger and 
resentment. Dwelling upon (or in) the incident can sometimes be the least efficacious 
way of resolving issues and promoting healing. 
By postponing further discussion of the incident, however, the man must acknowledge 
that there is a perception on the part of the woman that his actions were questionable 
and that he should consider that future situations of this nature could lead to similar 
breakdowns in the relationship. forgetfulness should not be taken as license to con-
tinue this “supposed” behavior, but rather as a time of reflection. The healing aspect of 
moral forgetfulness can also be an expression of love that signals the ability to weather 
this crisis, a crisis that is grounded in epistemical difficulties and not matters of the 
heart. This takes a magnanimous gesture on the woman’s part that is rooted in love and 
that must eventually be responded to in kind. 
The difficulties that couples have in maintaining harmony when faced with epistemical 
difficulties whether related to perceptual claims regarding mountains or flirting are no 
doubt common. These difficulties hamper forgiveness and, thus reconciliation, leav-
ing both parties to consider the even more difficult moral decision to forget a hurtful 
incident just as people who use ethno-national stories may never be able to reconcile 
with their adversaries but may resort to forgetfulness in order to re-establish social 
harmony. 
3. Identities and ethno-national stories
This discussion may suggest that epistemical difficulties leading to interpersonal dis-
putes are simply due to a peculiar merging of the self-restraints on reasoning, includ-
ing background beliefs and values, that each person brings to the dispute. on the one 
hand, it may be not so much a denial of these commonplace self-restraints as it is a 
result of less rigorous restraints being employed; and sometimes not so much a car-
tesian doubt coming to life as it is a persistent use of these restraints in the search for 
truth and understanding. on the other hand, it may be less a matter of knowing a great 
deal after rigorous inquiry as it is a result of selective understanding through sources 
“sympathetic” to favored beliefs; and sometimes not so much a matter of being in pos-
session of a diversity of experiences and beliefs as it is a matter of having fewer expe-
riences but with well-established beliefs based on those experiences. all this may be 
indicative of the disputes between the man and woman previously discussed. 
unfortunately, these epistemical difficulties are even more pervasive when it comes to 
persons “endorsing” as their dominant identity the membership in some group, par-
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ticularly a group defined in terms of ethno-nationalism. The importance of being a 
member of a larger group cannot be underestimated and becomes particularly clear 
when ethno-national labels are at work in peoples’ speaking and writing that reflect a 
“politics of difference.” Moreover, group identities are defined in relation to members 
of other groups (Erkisen 2002, 10), so Bosniaks, Bosnian croats, and Bosnian serbs 
are defined counterposed with one another. inasmuch as “a defining element of each 
group’s identity is its relationship to the land and its history,” this relationship can be 
exclusivist, with one group’s claims legitimate while the others are illegitimate (Kel-
man 2004, 63). This can make conflict resolution exceedingly difficult, if not impos-
sible, particularly when the group feels threatened as has been the case in the Balkans 
(conces 2005).
Each individual does not have a simple identity but rather possesses a multitude of 
identities, each of which may be invoked privately and/or publicly as dominant in any 
given situation: no identity can be taken as the definitive one. take, for instance, an 
ethnic serb woman in her 30s who is studying in the law faculty at the university of 
Banja luka. she may privilege one or more aspects of her identity (ethnicity, gender, 
and occupation) over others depending on the situation she faces. she can present her-
self as a “serb” in one context, a “woman” in another, and a “law student” in a third. in 
each, she emphasizes or makes visible different aspects of her identity and thus names 
herself differently. indeed, she may find it advantageous to privilege a combination of 
these such that she presents herself as a “serb woman” or a “female serb law student,” 
some of the plurality of selves that she can manifest.7 
however, once this woman reduces her plurality of selves so that her endorsed ethno-
national identity becomes the dominant feature of her personal identity, she can best 
be described as a “serb nationalist.” as a nationalist, she exaggerates the value of her 
ethno-national belonging so that ethnicity becomes a principal thread of her identity 
(Miscevic 1992, 254). to identify with serbhood means not only that she ascribes serb-
hood to herself, i.e., believes that she is a member of that nation called serbia, but that 
this endorsement is taken to be an effective force in her character. indeed, the causal 
efficacy of the endorsed feature that she has identified with helps to explain why she 
does the sorts of things that she does (Miscevic 1992, 245). in addition to the cognitive 
component of this identification, there is a conative component. When ethno-nation-
ality is seen as a positive force in one’s life, a person develops deep emotional ties with 
the nationality and cares about its preservation. This caring for one’s nationality comes 
into evidence when a person’s nationality comes under attack from members of anoth-
7 It is worth noting that people might engage in genuine self-deception when their ethnic identity is perceived 
to be threatened. Although a person deceiving herself about being a “Serb woman” is perhaps unrealistic unless 
certain pathologies were at work, a Bosnian Serb could deceive herself into believing that she is someone who 
holds no animosity towards Bosniaks. This could be explained, for example, by her failing to recognize her true 
motives for standing by as Muslims in her village were systematically harmed. For a discussion of the difference 
between self-deception and hypocrisy, see McKinnon 1999, 190-200.
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er ethno-national community, and that attack is taken to be personal, because of the 
strength of this identification. in a multiethnic society such as Bosnia, these nationalist 
leanings may act as an impediment to the creation of a stable democracy.8 
The ideology of ethno-nationalism arises when there is a collective shift of identity 
(conces 2002, 285-86). croatian, serbian, and Bosniak nationalism are all obstruc-
tionist to the creation of genuine democracy and an open society. This occurs through 
the generation of xenophobia and ethnic chauvinism, which threatens a country’s sta-
bility by “transforming those who are of the ‘wrong’ identity into second-class citizens, 
contrary to the notion of rights and liberties understood within a democratic frame-
work” (conces 2002, 286). cultural markers are deployed to differentiate the dominant 
group from the other groups, which are taken to be culturally inferior. certain differ-
ences become more pronounced, leading to marginalization, ostracism, and cultural 
absolutism (conces 2002, 288). 
When we say that a person is an ethno-nationalist, however, we are not simply say-
ing that she has such a strong bond with a particular ethno-nationalism that she will 
tend to act and feel in certain ways; we are also saying that she will tend to think in 
certain ways. how will thinking occur for the ideologue of ethno-nationalism? is the 
ideologue also a fanatic? although being a fanatic takes on many connotations, it is 
reasonable to think that the fanatic stands at one end of a continuum of how strictly 
one holds to commonplace self-restraints on belief construction and maintenance. at 
one end is the ideologue of ethno-nationalism qua fanatic; at the other end is the criti-
cal thinker extraordinaire. as previously mentioned, the salient traits of the fanatic 
include being self-righteous, intolerant, overly certain, and zealous. The precursors of 
the ethno-national fanatic are set as she grows up in an environment that emphasizes 
ethno-nationalism as a dominating identifier. although those who are ethno-nation-
alists may never become fanatics who are so convinced that their cause is a just one 
that they will pursue actions that are thought of as both unreasonable and immoral 
by many outsiders, they may engage in fanatical reasoning if they perceive that their 
favored beliefs and way of life are threatened. and this may well lead them on the road 
to terrorism. 
8 It should be pointed out that because one’s group identity is defined in relation to other groups of the same 
category (e.g., a person’s Bosniak identity in relation to Serb and Croat identities) and given the xenophobia and 
ethnic chauvinism that has been manifested inward against ethnic groups within a country like Bosnia, it would be 
worthwhile to find ways to shift the dominant identity from ethno-nationality to citizenship (shown by a change 
of labels from Serb Bosnian to Bosnian Serb, for example). This would have the benefit of having a dominant 
identity that cuts across ethno-national lines, thereby redirecting the xenophobia and chauvinism outwardly to 
other groups, such as citizens of other countries. However, the damaging effects of xenophobia and chauvin-
ism would be better contained within the numerous interactions between democratic countries, interactions in 
areas that include the political, diplomatic, economic, and sports. Of course, someone might object and look to 
humanity as the ideal dominant trait. However, humanity does not carry the same cohesiveness as citizenship for 
the simple fact that group identities are juxtaposed to one another, and currently there is no group of the same 
or higher category to call the “other.” This would be satisfied by first contact with an intelligent alien race from 
another planet. 
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an outside calamity, such as a group of political leaders attempting to use their militar-
ies to carve up a neighbouring country in the hope of creating a greater this or a greater 
that, as was partly the case in the Balkans, could lead to a such a threatening situation 
for the inhabitants of the doomed country. in such a case, the threat extends to their 
beliefs, way of life, and narratives; in effect, it becomes an “existential threat” that chal-
lenges their identity as a people. it is a threat in which one’s very existence is ultimately 
connected to the negation of the other (Kelman 2007). it is no surprise, then, that such 
threatening situations produce the kind of fear, rage, and anxiety that they do leading 
to the worst atrocities imaginable directed toward the threatening other. and it is no 
surprise that the commonplace self-restraints on reasoning become short circuited the 
way they do, thus contributing to the unspeakable. 
The moral philosopher r.M. hare contributed significantly to our understanding of 
the fanatic in two ways. first, hare distinguishes the impure from the pure or true 
fanatic. in general, he counterposes the fanatic with the utilitarian, thus defining the 
fanatic as one who possesses moral opinions that are divergent from those of the utili-
tarian. What distinguishes the more numerous impure fanatic from its pure cousin is 
that the former’s moral opinions stray from the utilitarian’s because the fanatic is “un-
able or unwilling to engage in ... critical thinking,” which is understood as a “refusal or 
inability to face facts or to think clearly, or for other reasons” (hare 1981, 170). clearly, 
this sort of fanatic is what i had in mind above. however, hare seems to complicate 
matters by shuffling the aforementioned continuum by situating the pure fanatic in 
close proximity to the critical thinker extraordinaire. This he does by defining the pure 
fanatic as “someone who ... [is] able and willing to think critically, but somehow sur-
vived the ordeal still holding moral opinions different from those of the utilitarian” 
(hare 1981, 171). This reshuffling is spurious, however. for if hare’s reference to the 
“critical thinking” of the pure fanatic is understood as a claim that such a fanatic has 
the capacity for argumentation, but lacks the commonplace self-restraints on reason-
ing, then the pure fanatic can be returned alongside her impure cousin just opposite 
the restrained critical thinker extraordinaire. having said this, it seems only correct for 
hare to view the pure fanatic with some trepidation. hare is worried, for he writes: 
if there are people so wedded to some fanatical ideal that they are able to imagine, 
in their full vividness, the sufferings of the persecuted, and who can still prescribe 
universally that this persecution should go on in the service of their ideals, even 
if it were they themselves who had to suffer thus, then they will remain unshaken 
by any argument that i have been able to discover. (hare 1963, 184)
hare’s second contribution comes in the form of countering that despair with hope. he 
makes it clear that all is not lost, and that the key to dealing with fanatics is to “separate 
from the true fanatics, whose ideals really are proof against the ordeal by imagination 
and the facts, those who support them merely because they are thoughtless and insen-
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sitive [i.e., impure fanatics]” (hare 1963, 184). so in his view, if the impure fanatics 
can be dealt with through the use of “powerful arguments,” and pure fanatics only get 
their power over others (the impure fanatics) as a result of “confused thinking,” i.e., “by 
concealing facts and spreading falsehoods; by arousing passions which will cloud the 
sympathetic imagination—in short by all the familiar methods of propaganda,” then 
the fanatics will succumb to a divide and conqueror strategy (hare 1963, 185). hare 
thinks, then, that moral philosophy’s ability to immunize the masses against the power 
of propaganda will also lead to them being immunized against the fanatic. 
 it would be wonderful if the world were entirely composed of good epistemic agents, 
i.e., persons who take epistemic reasons seriously; then all those commonplace self-
restraints that are nullified in fanatical reasoning would remain in place to guarantee 
that self-deception and other distortions of belief would not take hold in the first place. 
unfortunately, ethno-nationalism does take hold the minds of individuals to the point 
when self-restraints are made ineffective. yet, having said this, not all succumb to eth-
no-nationalism or other ideologies in ways that drastically jeopardize self-restraints. 
often enough, the presence of fanatical reasoning is found by many to be repulsive. as 
Jonathan adler notes in his insightful article “faith and fanaticism,” 
The beliefs and values...that back your revolt at the fanatic’s conclusion ...rest on a 
huge bedrock of learning, critical evaluation, and mutual support. no argument 
to a conclusion that would nullify these beliefs and values could be endorsed, 
except under the most far-out circumstances. Even if you went along with the 
initial part of the fanatic’s argument, you would not allow your own reasoning 
to overrule this wealth of knowledge. your modesty extends to not demanding 
that you first understand exactly where the fanatic’s argument goes wrong, as a 
condition on its rejection. your deference to this wealth of knowledge is not even 
a choice. The conclusion simply cannot be believed. Effectively, your well-founded 
beliefs and values are not merely reasons to object to the fanatic’s argument, but 
controls or restraints on your own reasoning. (adler 2007, 269-70)
still, there is something unsettling about how this “revolt” takes place, for even those 
who are appalled by the fanatic and her reasoning develop their bedrock of learning, 
critical evaluation, and mutual support that generate their well-founded beliefs and 
values through cultural lenses of various sorts and some of those lenses have to do with 
nationalism of different types. perhaps the questions that should concern us are three-
fold: (a) What is the connection between those commonplace restraints and personal 
identity? (b) under what conditions does a person’s plurality of selves become reduced 
so that a particular identity, such as ethno-nationalism, becomes the dominant feature 
of her identity? and (c) What is the precise mechanism by which ethno-nationalism as 
a dominant identity reduces the commonplace self-restraints on reasoning? once these 
are understood, a world with less fanaticism may become a reality. in the meantime, 
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persons whose plurality of selves has been reduced along ethno-nationalist lines will 
relax those self-restraints or selectively employ them for their own perceived good. 
This can be seen in the use of different kinds of stories in defense of how members of 
a person’s own ethnic group behave towards members of other groups. in Love Thy 
Neighbor: A Story of War, peter Maass introduces Vera and stana Milanović, a serb 
mother and daughter who were forced out of their homes by fighting in central Bosnia 
in 1992. The dialogue between Maass and Vera is as follows: 
i asked, out of politeness, whether the fighting in the village was heavy.
“Why, no, there was no fighting between Muslims and serbs in the village,” she 
said.
“Then why were the Muslims arrested?”
“Because they were planning to take over the village. They had already drawn up 
lists. The names of the serb women had been split into harems for the Muslim 
men.”
“harems?”
“yes, harems. Their Bible says men can have harems, and that’s what they were 
planning to do once they had killed our men. Thank God they were arrested 
first.” she wiped her brow.
“how do you know they were planning to kill the serb men and create harems 
for themselves?”
“it was on the radio. our military had uncovered their plans. it was announced 
on the radio.”
“how do you know the radio was telling the truth?” i asked.
stana and Vera stared at me as though i wore no clothes. God, these americans 
are dumber than cows. Vera’s kindness evaporated as she flashed the kind of 
scowl that, i imagine, was deployed against grandchildren who wore farm boots 
indoors.
“Why,” she demanded to know, “would the radio lie?”
“Did any of the Muslims in your village harm you?” i asked, softly.
“no.”
“Did any Muslim ever do anything bad to you?”
“no.”
she seemed offended.
“My relations with Muslims in the village were always very good. They were very 
nice people.” (Maass 1997, 113-14)
although Vera seems to be far from being a fanatic, her responses to Maass’ questions 
are indicative of fanatical reasoning prompted by the circumstance of war. first, the ar-
rest of the Muslims (Bosniaks) in her village was not justified on the grounds that they 
were fighting. rather, they were arrested on the grounds of a perceived conspiracy to 
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murder serb men and then to create harems. apparently the motive for these murders 
was to continue the custom of polygamy as referred to in the Qur’an. although the 
Qur’an does permit this practice, we must ask why Vera thought such a practice would 
begin when it had never been practiced by Muslims in Bosnia. The fact that polygamy 
was not a practice of Bosniaks was bracketed. Why would it start now? The answer is 
made clear: it was announced on the radio that the military had uncovered the plot. 
Vera does not believe the conspiracy simply because she wants to. she believes it be-
cause the announcement of it comes from what she takes to be credible sources, the 
radio station and the military. as she says, “Why would the radio lie?” no doubt she 
believes that the radio announcers and the military have nothing to gain from lying 
to the community. if anything, the radio station and the military high command are 
those institutions to be depended upon during times of crisis. Vera’s favored beliefs 
and way of life were threatened by the war, and the media and the military made her 
aware that the threat was not a distant one, but one in her own small village in central 
Bosnia. This was the occasion that permitted her to indulge in self-deception. 
second, the veracity of the claims made by the authorities within the serb controlled 
part of Bosnia is a part of the context of her lived history with the Bosniaks of her vil-
lage. not only did Bosniaks not practice polygamy, but her relations with Bosniaks 
in her village were “always very good” and they were “very nice people.” apparently, 
those facts carried much less weight than the claims made by the authorities. in her 
mind, even very nice people could commit murder. But in this case the acts of mur-
der that were said to be planned were connected to a (a) particular ethnic group—
Bosniaks; (b) marriage practice referred to in the Qur’an, the holy text of Bosniaks; 
and (c) marriage custom that was never practiced by Bosniaks. Vera never questioned 
whether the authorities might have an agenda of their own against the Bosniaks. and 
so Vera watched as her neighbors, those same “very nice people,” were rounded up and 
taken away. The epistemic landscape was primed for her easy assent to the arrest order 
delivered by the serb authorities, an order that her moral conscience let stand without 
examination.
4. Concluding remarks
some theorists make it clear that there are such deep dissimilarities between the inter-
personal conflict and the ethno-national conflict that it is unwise to use insights from 
one to help understand the other. This point deserves some comment because it sug-
gests that what i have done in this article is to have oversimplified the ethno-national 
by overextending the interpersonal. first, practically speaking, there are deep dissimi-
larities between the two kinds of conflict as can be inferred from the work of theorists 
and practitioners who subscribe to the diplomatic track of resolving the ethno-nation-
al variety. it is one thing to face a stubborn partner who persists in challenging your 
r. J. conces  Epistemical and Ethical Troubles in Achieving Reconciliation, and then Beyond
39
perceptual claims about seeing a particular mountain or who requires of you a defense 
against the claim that you were being flirtatious towards another woman and quite an-
other to deal with ethno-national communities at war. although the former disputes 
may be significant to you personally, neither one of these is likely to have anything to 
do with life or death situations nor with the internal and external factors that cause 
countries to go to war and to bring an end to a war. This may suggest to some that 
interpersonal and ethno-national conflicts have very different mechanisms for their 
cause, as well as for their resolution. 
My response to this criticism is that to dwell on the dissimilarities is to “depersonalize” 
ethno-national conflicts, to treat them as if there were no human participants, par-
ticipants who must deal with a wide range of epistemical and ethical concerns at the 
most fundamental level of perception and judgment. and in doing so, it unknowingly 
invests in the diplomatic approach without taking seriously the interpersonal level, 
which is important for any approach to reconciliation and peacebuilding. 
What makes the approach of this work so unique is that it recognizes that the world is 
not populated by rawlsian “persons” created behind a veil of ignorance that denies them 
knowledge of their natural assets and social identities, as well as the myriad of ways that 
these can conflict. instead, it portrays persons as they are in everyday life; as rational and 
emotive beings who are quite capable of sliding along the continuum of commonplace 
self-restraints that keep reasoning on an even keel. Becoming fanatics and/or engaging 
in fanatical reasoning are real possibilities for all of us. it also casually leads the reader 
from reflecting on important epistemical and ethical concerns that underlie the more 
inane situations that we find ourselves in to recognizing that those same concerns persist 
unknowingly in the lives of those immersed in ethno-national conflict. 
The scenarios of the conversant couple were “designed” conversations, but designed 
with the purpose of showing that partners can engage in a serious epistemical free-
for-all and still come up short with no clear ending or agreed-upon conclusion whose 
truth value is recognized by both (Walzer 2007, 22-25). it made no difference whether 
the object of the conversation was a dispute about perceiving a mountain in sarajevo 
or flirtatious behaviour on board a train bound for rijeka. The war time scenario in-
volving the mother and the famed war correspondent was not constructed but part of 
an interview, yet the hope of each participant seemed to be to persuade the other that 
he or she had overlooked the obvious. to be sure, Vera was in a life or death situation 
that put her self-restraints to the ultimate test and that would likely delay any recon-
ciliation until after the war. yet the epistemical problems and the subsequent concerns 
with moral judgments that seem to underlie Vera’s responses would no doubt plague 
those ethno-nationalists left to deal with one another long after the war ended. 
some would have us believe that the reconciliation desired in a post-conflict society is 
socio-emotional reconciliation meant to produce a “psychological revolution” in the 
personal psyche stemming from truth telling and the granting of forgiveness by the 
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victim (nadler 2000, 132-36). This is true, but it cannot be overstated that the verac-
ity of the truth claims upon which moral judgments are founded may come under 
such intense scrutiny that the act of forgiveness is jeopardized, thereby placing recon-
ciliation in doubt. in the case of Vera and her compatriots, these concerns are at work 
whether or not they realize it:
truth-telling is likely to turn into a reciprocal cycle of accusations, reinforce 
stereotypes and deepen mistrust, rather than result in forgiveness. in this case, 
reconciliation is predicated not on discovering a single and ultimate truth, but 
on the realization that each of the parties has its own truth. accepting the other’s 
legitimate victimhood and admitting one’s own wrong-doing is particularly 
difficult in this case where truth is multi-faceted and where angelic or satanic 
deeds are not neatly placed on either side of the fence. to accept the other’s 
pains, and one’s responsibility for causing them, requires empathy and trust that 
simply does not exist between the two former enemies who are preoccupied 
with their own pains and victimization as they close the door on the conflictual 
past. (nadler 2000, 135-36) 
allowing these epistemical concerns to go unattended makes it possible for people like 
Vera to adopt questionable, if not unwarranted, empirical claims and moral judgments 
of others. until Vera is reasonably able to question the credibility of the media and 
the military, she will make little progress elsewhere. not having learned the lesson of 
why it is important and dutiful to conscientiously hold beliefs, Vera is bound to the 
sort of fanatical reasoning exhibited by ethno-nationalists. furthermore, without the 
willingness or ability to examine events, moral forgetfulness as a means to restore so-
cial harmony is not possible, especially if what must be forgotten, even if for only a 
short while, are the atrocities that were perpetrated by each party (or, in Vera’s case, the 
atrocities that were allegedly intended to be perpetrated). 
perhaps the only means to achieving harmony at this point is what some would call 
“instrumental reconciliation,” suited to achieving the “goal of separate co-existence” 
(nadler 2000, 132). This is essentially long-term peacebuilding in the form of “count-
less projects [such as projects dealing with access to fresh water and sanitation] in 
which the former adversaries learn to cooperate with each other as equals” (nadler 
2000, 136). over time trust is built up between the parties to the point that they can 
begin to “address the thorny issues that socio-emotional reconciliation deals with: vic-
timhood, blame, forgiveness and divergent versions of history. to arrive at this stage 
the two parties must first learn to coexist and respect the integrity of the other” (na-
dler 2000, 136). although this is neither reconciliation nor social harmony brought 
about by moral forgetfulness, it is nevertheless peacebuilding. 
it might also be argued that becoming a morally conscientious agent, as someone who 
absolutely cares about true belief and the other epistemic goods, including common-
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place self-restraints, is simply an unattainable ideal. This is correct; we are not moral 
saints and cannot attain sainthood. yet it is essential that we have a clear vision of 
mankind before our mind’s eye in order to keep our house in order. The 19th- century 
English mathematician and philosopher W.K. clifford made clear what that vision 
should be: 
[i]f i let myself believe anything on insufficient evidence, there may be no 
great harm done by the mere belief; it may be true after all, or i may never have 
occasion to exhibit it in outward acts. But i cannot help doing this great wrong 
toward Man, that i make myself credulous. The danger to society is not merely 
that it should believe wrong things, though that is great enough; but that it 
should become credulous, and lose the habit of testing things and inquiring into 
them; for then it must sink back into savagery. (clifford 1879)
although some might take clifford’s evidentialist principle of only believing what we 
can prove to be too stringent, its principal lesson is to caution us against believing 
without evidence of some kind. Given the seriousness of this lesson, i think it is im-
portant to place clifford’s main concern on its head by being more worried about the 
wrongs done to individual men, women, and children by the thousands if not millions 
due to those whose epistemic self-restraints and moral conscientiousness have been 
compromised than to humanity. The real savagery lies with the tearing apart of living 
and breathing human beings, and this is something that we must guard against at the 
epistemical level before it hinders our capacity to make humane normative judgments 
and prefaces our long journey towards forgiveness and reconciliation, or moral forget-
fulness and social harmony. 
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